The limited nature of data on employment referrals in large business and household surveys has so far restricted our understanding of the relationships among employment referrals, match quality, wage trajectories and turnover. Using a new …rm-level dataset that includes explicit information on whether a worker was referred by a current employee of the company, we are able to provide rich detail on these empirical relationships for a single mid-to-large U.S. corporation, and to test various predictions of the theoretical literature on labor market referrals. We …nd that referred workers enter at higher wage levels, all else equal, but that the referred wage advantage dissipates by the third year of employment. After the …fth year the referral-wage relationship is reversed.
Introduction
There is wide empirical consensus, both in economics and in sociology, on the widespread use of informal referrals in the labor market. 1 For instance, Corcoran et al. (1980) analyze national data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and …nd that between 52% and 58% of male workers under the age of 45 heard about their current job from friends or relatives; for their …rst job these estimates range between 55% and 67%. 2 However, the information on referrals is often indirect, and there is little direct evidence on the impact of labor market referrals on the quality of the matches between …rms and workers.
The limited nature of data on employment referrals in large business and household surveys has so far restricted our understanding of the relationships among employment referrals, match quality, wage trajectories and turnover 3 . Using a new …rm-level dataset that includes explicit information on whether a worker was referred by a current employee of the company, we are able to provide rich detail on these empirical relationships for a single mid-to-large U.S. corporation, and to test various predictions of the theoretical literature on labor market referrals.
We …nd that referred workers enter at higher wage levels, all else equal, but that the referred wage advantage dissipates by the third year of employment. After the …fth year the referral-wage relationship is reversed. Referred workers experience substantially less turnover, and this e¤ect is relatively long-lasting. Despite higher predicted productivity for referred workers in the theoretical literature, we …nd, if anything, slightly slower promotion rates for referred than for non-referred workers. Finally, the wide range of skill and experience levels represented in this corporation permit detailed analysis of the role of referrals for workers from support sta¤ to company executives.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 relates this paper to the rich and varied empirical literature on employee networks in general and referral in particular. In Section 3 we review existing theory on labor market referrals and note several testable predictions. Section 4 describes our new …rm-level data on employee referral status, tenure outcomes, and promotion and salary trajectories. 1 See Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) and Topa (2011) for surveys of the economics literature, and Marsden and Gorman (2001) for a survey of the sociology literature. 2 See also Datcher (1983) . Pellizzari (2004) analyzes a large panel dataset of European households (the European Community Household Panel) and …nds that between 25% and 40% of respondents in most countries heard about their current job through informal contacts. On the employer side, Marsden (2001) and Holzer (1987b) use national surveys of U.S. …rms and …nd that a little over one third of …rms surveyed in 1991 and in 1982 (respectively) often used referrals from current employees when publicizing vacancies. 3 A notable exception is Datcher (1983) 1
The empirical speci…cations used to test the various predictions generated by models of employee referrals, results of these tests and other empirical …ndings are found in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
Related empirical literature
Empirical research on labor market referrals has emphasized the identi…cation of e¤ective proxies for referred worker status, as a result of the di¢ culty of measuring referral status in most relevant With regard to the impact of referrals on hiring probabilities, Holzer (1987a) …nds that that the probability of obtaining a job or receiving an o¤er through personal contacts is higher than that through formal methods. Holzer (1988) also …nds that among all search methods, informal methods (personal contacts and direct applications) generated the most o¤ers and acceptances conditional on o¤er. The high fraction of jobs found through informal means re ‡ects both high usage and high productivity of these methods. With regard to match outcomes, Datcher (1983) uses PSID data and …nds lower turnover (quit rates) in jobs found through personal contacts rather than formal means, for blacks and for college educated but not for those with high school or less.
A few richly informative studies of referral based on …rm-level data and explicit referral information address the subject from a sociological perspective. Fernandez and Weinberg (1997) , Castilla (2000, 2001) and Castilla (2005) use data from a retail bank and a call center to study the role of referral networks in hiring for low to moderate skill jobs. Much of the focus of these papers is on the hiring stage, and on initial productivity. Major …ndings include that referred applicants are more likely to be hired after controlling for other observables, that referrers do have relevant information about referred employees and that there is some evidence of assortative matching between referrer and referred. Castilla has direct measures of worker productivity from a call center and …nds that referred workers are in fact more productive.
However, these studies do not follow employees for long post-hire periods, and they generally do not rely on the tools of labor economics. This study is the …rst, to our knowledge, to use explicit data on individual employees'referral status to relate referrals to immediate and long-term employment outcomes including starting salary, salary trajectory over time, promotion patterns and stability of the job match, and hence we are the …rst, again to our knowledge, to be able to test the collection of predictions generated by the theoretical literature on employee referrals regarding salary trajectories, promotion and turnover using explicit data on employees'referral status.
3 Theoretical models of employment referrals and their predictions Simon and Warner (1992) is an early and relatively in ‡uential example of the theory of labor market referrals. They embed employee referrals in a Jovanovic (1979 Jovanovic ( , 1984 model of job matching and turnover, and use this partial equilibrium framework to derive predictions for di¤erences in salary and match duration between referred and non-referred workers. They emphasize three predictions that we will be able to address directly using our explicit referral information below.
Their model predicts that referred workers, or workers hired through the "old boy network", will (i) earn higher starting salaries, (ii) gradually lose their salary advantage and (iii) display longer tenure in the …rm than comparable workers hired through other means. As a result of their partial equilibrium, dynamic framework, testing the types of predictions generated by the Simon and
Warner model involves immediate and ongoing observation of referred and non-referred workers in a single employment spell, a task for which our panel of …rm-level data is well suited. 4 Montgomery (1991) is another seminal paper on the role of referrals in the labor market. He argues that referrals from current employees may reduce the adverse selection problem an employer 4 Note that Simon and Warner test the predictions of their old boy network model using the 1972 Survey of Natural and Social Scientists and Engineers, a collection of retrospective self-reports on employment experiences. We discuss their …ndings in conjunction with our own empirical results below. While our data have the advantages of being roughly 30-50 years more recent, being derived from an administrative source and representing a considerably wider range of worker skill levels, their data have the obvious advantage of representing more than one …rm.
3 faces when trying to hire someone, if there is uncertainty about worker or match quality. He formalizes this idea in a labor market model in which formal and informal search methods coexist in equilibrium. Firms set their wages before observing a new worker's productivity; current employees are likely to know someone of similar quality given assortative matching in personal networks. This implies that by relying on referrals employers can alleviate the adverse selection problem they face. In equilibrium, the model implies that wages of jobs obtained through referrals are higher than wages of jobs found through other means. Montgomery (1991) also derives some interesting comparative statics: an increase in either network density or assortative matching increase referral wages relative to market wages, and increases the dispersion in the wage distribution.
Prediction 1: Referred applicants are more likely to be hired
More recent theoretical papers on employee referrals include Galenianos (2011) and Dustmann et al. (2011) . Galenianos models worker and …rm search with and without productivity heterogeneity in the presence of networks that yield (informative) referrals. As the (exogenous) rate at which referrals are generated increases, the aggregate job …nding rate rises and labor market tightness decreases. Together, these imply that a higher prevalence of referrals will be associated to higher estimated matching e¢ ciency -in estimates of an aggregate matching function. Other predictions include that referrals are associated with the hiring of more productive workers. Access to referral networks both decreases a worker's unemployment probability and increases the worker's wage.
Further, a worker's job-…nding rate increases with the rate of employment among members of her network.
Importantly, the Galenianos model with worker heterogeneity delivers the theoretical implication that workers who meet a …rm through referrals are more likely to be hired than workers who meet the …rm through random matching. This is because high productivity workers are more likely to be employed and therefore are more likely to refer one of their social contacts. Because of assortative matching, those who are referred are more likely to be other high productivity workers.
Therefore, when a worker and a …rm meet, a referred job candidate is more likely to be hired than a non-referred one, all else equal. We will be able to test this hypothesis directly with our data. Note that the Galenianos model emphasizes the roles of the job seeker and potential employer in the context of a matching model, where referrals a¤ect the aggregate job …nding rate and the properties 4 of the equilibrium matching function. Therefore, some of its predictions may be best tested using the business and household survey data on which much of the referral network has relied to date.
A simple model of employee referral
We brie ‡y present here a simple model of job matching, adapted heavily from Dustmann et al.
(2011). Dustmann et al. model both initial worker-…rm contact in referral and external markets and the ongoing wage negotiation over time between a matched worker and the …rm. In this sense, their approach …ts our current purposes more closely. They generate richer predictions for the employment trajectory than other available models of employee referral, and they have more to say about the wage renegotiation process within a single employment spell. For these reasons, we focus on the Dustmann et al. model and intuitions behind its various predictions.
Let us begin by laying out the fundamental features of the Dustmann et al model, after which we will provide some intuition for its main empirical predictions. The Dustmann et al. model draws heavily on the speci…cation in Simon and Warner, which in turn is based on the job matching model of Jovanovic. Hence the various approaches on which we pin our tests share common assumptions and intuition. Consider an economy consisting of N workers and L …rms producing according to a constant returns to scale technology, and in which …rms may enter (by posting a vacancy) and leave freely. Firms and workers are risk neutral payo¤ maximizers. When unemployed, workers receive unemployment bene…t b. Firms experience cost of an un…lled vacancy k. True underlying productivity y is match-speci…c and drawn from distribution N ( ; 2 ):
When a worker and …rm meet, they observe a noisy signal of the match's true productivity, b y j = y + " j , where " j N (0; 2 j ) and j 2 fR; Eg indicates the worker's referred or external market status: Given a posting, a referral may or may not be available to the …rm according to an exogenous process. The e¤ect of the referral is to modify the informativeness of the productivity signal observed by the worker and …rm, so that " R N (0; 2 R ) and " E N (0; 2 E ), with 2 R < 2 E :
In the interest of expositional simplicity, we abstract from several features of the problem included in Dustmann et al. We assume a zero rate of match destruction and that employers and employees observe the true match quality in the second period of employment with certainty, rather than with a positive probability in each subsequent period of employment. 3. In the next period, each worker-…rm pair in a surviving match learns the true productivity of the match. The …rm makes a new wage o¤er. If the employee turns down the wage o¤er then the match is dissolved, the employee becomes unemployed and the position becomes vacant.
Wage and employment determination after true productivity is revealed
Following the revelation of true productivity y, workers and …rms allocate the surplus of the match according to
where W 2 represents the value to the worker following match quality revelation, V 2 the value to the …rm and w 2 the wage. Total surplus from the match is y. Given a value of unemployment in this period of b and that free entry drives the value of a vacancy to zero, only matches whose productivity meet the total of worker and …rm outside options are continued after match quality revelation, so 6 that only matches such that y > y where y = b + 0 survive. Note that this reservation value is common to matches produced by referrals and matches produced by the outside market.
Wage and employment determination with unknown productivity with and without referral
De…ne m j to be the expected value of match productivity for a worker and …rm who have just met through mechanism j 2 fR; Eg. Let w j represent the wage the …rm pays the worker in the current period. Then
where W 1j represents the value of accepting the match for the worker, is the discount rate and dF j (yjm j ; 2 j ) is the density of true match productivity given current expected productivity m j and variance of the external market signal 2 j :
Similarly, the value to the …rm of an accepted wage o¤er w j is
We assume wages are determined by Nash bargaining, with share of the surplus going to the worker, so that
where U represents the value of …rst period unemployment and is common to referred and external market matches. Dustmann et al. demonstrate that there exists a reservation match quality m j such that, if m > m j , workers prefer to accept the wage o¤er and …rms prefer to hire the worker,
Prediction 2: Referred workers receive higher initial wages
Observe that the second term in expression (1) is increasing in the variance of the signal, 2 j , and that the worker's value only need meet w j (m j ) + R max(W 2 ; b)dF j (yjm j ; 2 j ) = U in order for the match to be sustained. Hence the reservation wage demanded by referred workers is higher than the 7 reservation wage demanded by non-referred workers as a result of 2 R < 2 E : 5 The intuition behind this result is that, for the external market worker, the greater uncertainty in future productivity and therefore in the future wage implies greater probability mass over higher second period wages, while she or he is insured against the greater probability mass in the lower tail of the match distribution by the ability to quit in response to low match productivity realizations. In other words, the external market worker faces a higher upside potential while being insured against bad draws, so she has a lower initial reservation wage.
Both Simon and Warner and Galenianos also predict higher starting wages for referred workers.
The intuition driving this result is similar in Simon and Warner, while the source of the di¤erence in
Galenianos relies on homophily in referral networks and the higher average productivity of employed than of unemployed workers.
Prediction 3:
The referred worker wage advantage diminishes over time
As noted, Dustmann et al. employ a more complex version of the model than we have described here. As a result, they are only able to generate predictions for the salary trajectory using numerical methods. In an appendix to the paper, on page 34, they report numerical results indicating that the wage advantage accruing to the (still employed) referred worker over the (still employed) nonreferred worker diminishes with tenure in the …rm.
In a simpler framework more closely resembling what we have described here, Simon and Warner generate some intuition for this result by considering the limiting cases. Suppose, for example, that referrals perfectly reveal true match productivity in the …rst period, so that 2 R = 0. In this case the referral market reservation match value reverts to y = b, and as a result the …rst and second period reservation productivity values for the referred case are identical. Further, in this case referral wages are identical in the …rst and second periods, with no new information on match productivity revealed at the start of the second period. Assuming a less than perfectly informative signal for the external market ( 2 E > 0). this clearly implies a ‡atter wage pro…le for referred than for non-referred workers. Further, as we discuss in Prediction 4, the model predicts lower separations for referred than non-referred workers. Relatively more external market workers will separate over time, from the low end of the match quality distribution: thus, those external market 5 We leave proof that the reservation wage increases in the reservation match quality to Dustmann et al.
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workers who stay with the …rm will exhibit higher wage growth on average because of the nonrandom di¤erential attrition.
Note that Simon and Warner also consider the predicted e¤ect of referral where signals regarding referred and non-referred workers' match productivities are equally informative, but referred workers are on average of better match quality. This model generates an initial wage advantage for the referred but similar wage growth for referred and non-referred workers, and Simon and Warner interpret …ndings on the time path of the wage advantage of referred workers as a test of the relative importance of mean productivity di¤erences and productivity signal informativeness in explaining the referral advantage.
Prediction 4: Turnover is lower for referred workers
The lower turnover prediction in Dustmann et al. is analogous to the higher starting salary prediction in Dustmann et al. As discussed above, they demonstrate that the reservation match productivity in the referral market is higher than the reservation match quality in the external market, m R > m E , owing to the fact that greater uncertainty in true match productivity creates greater opportunity for wage growth for external market hires. Given that referred workers are better matched to their …rms than non-referred workers, the probability mass below the common match productivity reservation value that applies to all workers after productivity is revealed is greater for external market than for referred workers, and so more workers initially hired through the external market separate from their matches following productivity revelation.
Returning to Simon and Warner's limiting cases, suppose again that referrals perfectly reveal true match productivity in the …rst period, so that 2 R = 0. As discussed, in this case the referral market reservation match value reverts to y = b, the …rst and second period reservation productivity values for the referred case are identical, and wages are identical in the …rst and second periods.
No new information on match productivity is revealed at the start of the second period. As a result, no referred worker separates from the …rm at the start of the second period. Assuming a less than perfectly informative signal for the external market ( 2 E > 0), this limiting case generates the extreme prediction that all turnover takes place among external market hires, and all referred workers remain employed.
Alternatively, consider the case in which the external market productivity signal is completely uninformative. Then the external market expected productivity distribution collapses to N ( ; 2 ) and all external market job candidates meeting …rms are hired and draw the same wage (presuming a su¢ ciently favorable underlying match quality distribution for employment to take place). If the referral market productivity signal contains any information, then workers and …rms meeting by referral, unlike those meeting in the external market, will be able to reject some lower segment of signalled productivities. Therefore when match quality is fully realized for both external market and referred worker-…rm pairs in the second period, the proportion of referred workers with realized match productivities below the common reservation value of y = b will be smaller than the proportion of external market workers with match productivities below y = b (which will simply equal ( b )). Therefore the separation rate for referred workers following productivity revelation will be smaller than the separation rate for non-referred workers following productivity revelation.
Prediction 5:
The referred worker turnover advantage also diminishes over 
Prediction 6: Referred workers have higher expected productivity
The higher reservation match productivity of referred workers (m R > m E ) predicted by the model of Dustmann et al. would seem to predict higher expected match productivity for referred workers in general. Simon and Warner make similar predictions regarding reservation match productivity, and the link to expected match productivity over the full distributions of referred and non-referred workers is more direct in their simpler context. Further, Galenianos generates higher employer predictions of referred worker initial productivity in a decidedly di¤erent context. As discussed above, in a lower skilled pool of call center workers, Castilla (2005) …nds evidence of higher productivity (in a piece-rate sense) for referred than for non-referred workers. Greater initial or expected productivity of referred workers appears to be a common prediction of the employee referral literature.
Data and descriptive statistics
This study utilizes a unique dataset that includes all of the hires and applicants of a U.S. corporation which employs between 2,000 and 5,000 people. The corporation hires people for a broad range of tasks with all levels of educational backgrounds and years of work experience. This makes it an ideal sample to study the e¤ect of referrals across a variety of skill and education backgrounds.
Applicant data
The dataset covers all applicants to the corporation from 2006 to 2010. The data contain information about how the applicant found the position, whether through the corporation's website, campus recruiting, internet job boards, employee referrals, their own initiative, or another source.
In our data, an applicant can be associated to an employee referral in one of two ways: either if the applicant indicated the name of a current employee as the source of a referral, or if a current employee "claimed" that candidate as a referral (or both). In either case, once the applicant gets to the interview stage, the information on the referral source is veri…ed by the corporation's human resources department. 6 With the data, we calculate the number of applicants for each position and the portion of the applicants that were referred. 7 We have measures of the sta¤ level associated to each position, which we group into …ve categories: support, junior, mid-level, senior, or executive sta¤. The data also details the required years of job experience and education level. The outcomes of applicants, including whether they received an interview or o¤er and whether they accepted the o¤er, are also included. Lastly, the timing of the job posting appears in the data.
The estimation sample is restricted to include only job postings that result in a hire and those that received more than one applicant. We remove internship postings and positions that were only posted internally in the corporation. When former interns, former employees, or current employees apply for a position, we include them in the calculation of the size of the applicant pool, but we remove their individual observations from the estimation sample. If a former intern, former employee, or current employee ultimately is hired for the position, then that job is excluded from the sample. This re ‡ects our impression that these types of applicants likely experience di¤erent hiring processes. We also exclude from our data postings for positions for which workers were hired in bulk.
The …nal sample used in our analysis includes 62,127 job applicants for 340 positions. Therefore the corporation hired 0.55% of applicants. 
Employee data
The data also contain information on all of the hires from 2000 to the …rst half of 2011. The data detail how the employee applied for the job, whether through internet job boards, the organization's website, college or career fairs, employee referrals, or other methods. As with the applicant data, in order for a worker to be considered an employee referral, either the new hire must have reported the referral when applying for the job, or a current employee must have referred that worker through the company's internal referral system (or both). The referral source is veri…ed by the corporation's human resources department at the interview stage of the hiring process. The employees'rank in the organization, shifts, o¢ ce locations, full or part-time status, and on-leave status are observed at six month intervals. If the worker leaves the organization or receives a promotion, this information and the timing of the event appear in the data.
We restrict our estimation sample to include only …rst time hires because of likely di¤erences in the referrals and promotions of former employees and interns compared to other employees. The sample is also restricted to employees in the main location of the company. Interns are excluded from the sample because they are never promoted and they are attached to the corporation for a brief and externally determined period. Finally, we exclude the very top executives in the corporation.
The resulting estimation sample includes 1,774 unique employees, 29% of whom were referred by current employees before being hired. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our employee data estimation sample. Annual salary is reported in 2010 dollars. The salary …gures and the rates reported in the top panel of Table 2 Of the 1,774 unique workers ever observed in our sample, 1,005 (57 percent) are observed to be promoted during the sample window, and 638 (36 percent) are observed leaving the corporation.
The mean observed tenure in the organization by 2011 or exit, whichever occurs …rst, is 3.01
years. The mean time to promotion is 1.66 years. This averages the time between starting at the corporation or between promotions for all occurrences of promotions in the data. For those that receive a promotion, it takes on average 1.62 years to get promoted for the …rst time. In our sample an average of 151 new employees join the corporation and 56 leave each year. Since our sample contains only employees who began working at the organization in 2000 or later, the actual average number of employees who leave each year is higher.
One meaningful shortcoming of our data in the context of the broad literature on employment is the absence of data on hours of work. Our only measures of hours of work are indicators for whether the employee is working part time and whether the employee is currently on leave. However,
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there appears to be only modest variation in work hours in this sample. Roughly 97 percent of our sample of semiannual observations represents full time workers. Of course, there could be substantial unobserved hours variation among those workers whom the corporation classi…es as full time. As a result of our lack of hours data, we are unable to infer hourly wages from annual salaries.
We consider annual salary (or log annual salary) as our primary outcome variable for the earnings analysis portion of our empirical work.
In addition, the data do not include either education at the date of …rst employment or work experience before applying to the organization. In order to estimate the log earnings regressions that are standard in the literature, we require schooling and experience variables. Further, employees of the corporation sta¤ a wide range of positions, from support through executive, which clearly require a wide range of schooling and experience levels. We address this data limitation using the sta¤ category indicators described above. Since we observe the education and experience requirements for each job posting, we have a clear idea of the schooling and experience requirements associated with each sta¤ level. We …nd that sta¤ categories summarize schooling and experience requirements fairly e¤ectively. Hence we use sta¤ level at entry indicators in our earnings estimation to proxy for the schooling, experience and experience squared regressors employed by the majority of the literature.
A potentially important issue concerns the way in which an employee referral is recorded in our data. As mentioned above, for an applicant (or new hire) to be considered an employee referral in our data it must be the case that either the applicant indicated the referral source when applying for the job, or a current employee referred that person for a position at the company through the organization's internal referral system (or both). There are several potential measurement issues here, that may a¤ect our estimation results.
First, there may be under-reporting: someone may be hired through a referral even though the referrer did not bother to …ll out the relevant form with the company's referral system, and, in addition, the referred worker did not indicate the referral source at the time of the application. The combination of the two events seems unlikely: the referral recipient has the incentive to mention the referral as it likely raises the chances of being o¤ered the job; the referrer, on the other hand, has the incentive to "claim" the referral either for the monetary bonus or for other non-pecuniary bene…ts. If there is any under-reporting, as long as it is uncorrelated with the referred worker's characteristics, then it will likely only lead to an attenuation bias in our estimates. 8 Second,
and perhaps more importantly, it is possible that a current employee's decision to formally refer someone may be related to the candidate's success during the various stages of the recruiting and interviewing process for a given posting. This possibility is limited by the details of the referral process: the latest that a current employee can "claim" someone as a referral is at the interview stage, when the recruiter reviews the candidate's initial application. Therefore, the referrer cannot decide ex-post to refer someone, after observing whether the person is actually hired or not.
5 Empirical speci…cation and …ndings
Prediction 1: Referred candidates are more likely to be hired
A central prediction of Galenianos, as discussed above, is that referred workers are more likely to be hired, all else equal. Our …rst empirical step is to test this prediction using our data on the corporation's applicant pool and resulting hires. Note that Castilla, Fernandez and Weinberg, and
Fernandez and Castilla all con…rm this prediction in their bank and call center single-…rm hiring studies. Our test of this prediction extends the analysis to a broad range of skill levels and more recent hiring data, and, in addition, informs our …ndings regarding longer-term worker experiences for this particular corporation.
An initial perspective on the question of whether referrals increase the odds of being hired is provided by the raw interview and job o¤er rates reported in Table 3 . The most common application source in the sample by far is internet job boards. Job board applicants constitute 60 percent of the applicant sample. Moving from left to right in the job board row of Table 3 recruitment nor other sources demonstrate as steep an increasing trajectory across the hiring process as we observe for referred employees. The "other" category includes a variety of search methods that comprised a small proportion of applicants. These methods include sta¢ ng agencies, job fairs, print advertising, and professional a¢ liations. Though it is necessary to control for observable di¤erences among applicants and positions before making …nal inferences regarding the relationship between referrals and hiring outcomes, the unmanipulated data in Table 3 indicate a strong association between referral and the odds of an interview or o¤er.
Next we adopt a more formal approach, modeling the probability of being hired by the corporation in a linear probability framework. 9 Speci…cally, we estimate The estimates generated using expression (2) are reported in Table 4 . We estimate three versions of the model. In the …rst, we de…ne outcome H ij as an indicator for whether applicant i was interviewed for position j, and we estimate using the full sample of applicants. 10 In the second, we de…ne outcome H ij as an indicator for whether the applicant was o¤ered position j, and we again estimate using the full sample of applicants. In the third, we condition the estimation sample on applicant i having been interviewed for position j. This leaves us with a sample of 1,811
interviewees. Of these 1,811 interviewees, 428 are o¤ered the position for which they interviewed.
We again de…ne H ij as an indicator for whether the applicant received an o¤er. In this manner we are able to examine not only whether referrals are associated with a greater job o¤er probability,
but also at what stage of the hiring process any estimated referral advantage is manifested.
Our central …nding is that referred applicants are indeed more likely to be hired. 11 Among the set of applicant sources, internet job boards produce the largest number of observed applicants, and so we employ job boards as the omitted category. Relative to job board applicants, referred applicants are estimated to be 7.3 percentage points more likely to be interviewed for the position, and 2.3 percentage points more likely to receive an o¤er. Conditional on having been interviewed, referred applicants are 13.9 percentage points more likely than job board applicants to receive o¤ers. 12 Each of these coe¢ cient estimates for the referred category is signi…cant at the one percent level. Applicants sourced from the corporate website and who applied through their own initiative have interview and o¤er rates similar to those of job board applicants. As hinted by the Table 3 transition rates, however, "other" applicants, including those produced by campus recruiting, have interview and o¤er probabilities that are signi…cantly higher than those of job board applicants.
Other regressors in Table 4 pertain to the characteristics of the posting, and therefore their coe¢ cient estimates indicate the characteristics of more and less competitive job postings within the corporation. Unsurprisingly, a larger number of applicants signi…cantly increases the competitiveness of the position. However, the magnitude of this e¤ect is small: 100 more applicants for a position are associated with a 0.1 percentage point decrease in the probability that an applicant is interviewed. Surprisingly, the proportion of applicants that are referred increases the likelihood that an applicant for the position receives either an interview or an o¤er, and this e¤ect is signi…cant. A 10 percentage point increase in the proportion referred is associated with a 0.88 percentage point increase in the probability of an interview, and a 0.44 percentage point increase in the probability 1 1 To be precise, we focus here on two outcomes, being interviewed and receiving an o¤er. Most people who receive an o¤er end up accepting it and thus being hired, but we want to abstract here from the candidate's decision on whether or not to accept an o¤er. 1 Screening from the application to interview stage becomes stronger over time in our data, with the probability of being interviewed conditional on applying decreasing by 0.5 percentage points per year. Yet the probability of receiving an o¤er conditional on having been interviewed increases signi…cantly over time, and the overall o¤er probability for applicants does not vary signi…cantly over time. Finally, we see a lower probability for the applicant of being interviewed following the start of the recession, with, again, no signi…cant change in the overall probability of an o¤er.
Together these estimates suggest that screening resources are being shifted to earlier points in the hiring process over the course of the panel.
Prediction 2: Referred workers receive higher starting salaries
We begin by testing the prediction that referred workers receive higher starting salaries. First consider the simple linear speci…cation
where S i0 represents the starting salary of worker i, r i is an indicator for whether worker i was referred by a current employee of the corporation, X S i0 is a vector of controls measured at job entry including a sta¤ level indicator (as a proxy for schooling and experience at job entry) and indicators for company division, shift, work schedule and leave status, S t is a calendar year …xed e¤ect and " S i0 is an idiosyncratic error. Coe¢ cient estimates for the linear starting salary speci…cation are reported in the …rst column of Table 5 , with salary measured in thousands of 2010 dollars. We …nd that having been referred is associated with a $1,326 salary premium that is close to being statistically signi…cant at the conventional levels (the p-value equals 0.107).
A more conventional speci…cation in the context of the literature is the following log earnings regression:
where t represents calendar time and it indicates tenure in the corporation for employee i at time t.
Again, r i is an indicator for whether worker i was referred by a current employee of the corporation, X L it is a vector of controls including entering sta¤ level indicators (which again proxy for schooling and experience at job entry) and indicators for entering company division, shift, work schedule and leave status, L t is a calendar year …xed e¤ect and " L it is an idiosyncratic error. This log earnings regression is estimated using pooled data on employee half years, and allows us both to compare starting salaries for the referred and non-referred and to follow the e¤ect of referral on employees' salary trajectories over time.
The estimated coe¢ cient on referral in the log salary regression, reported in Table 6 , indicates a 2.1 percent starting salary premium for referred workers. The coe¢ cient is signi…cant at the one percent level. The magnitudes of the referral coe¢ cient estimates in the linear and log salary regressions are roughly consistent, given mean and median salaries of $102,740 and $97,377, respectively. Of course, there is wide dispersion in employee salaries in this corporation. Hence it is useful to consider the initial referral premium in both level and percentage terms, and the combination of the linear and the conventional log salary estimates allows us to do so. In sum, we …nd that an employee referral is associated with a starting salary premium of 2.1 percent, or more than $1,300.
This result bears out the predictions of not only Dustmann et al., but also Simon and Warner and
Galenianos. 13 
Prediction 3: The referred worker salary advantage diminishes over time
As discussed in Section 3.6, however, current theory of labor market referrals predicts that the referral e¤ect will dissipate over time, and the salaries of referred and non-referred workers who remain with the corporation will converge. The log salary estimates reported in Table 6 provide a test of the referred salary premium's time trajectory.
We …nd that the referral e¤ect does indeed diminish over time. In all linear speci…cations in Table 6 , 2 ; the coe¢ cient on the interaction between the referral indicator and tenure in the organization, is negative and signi…cant at the one percent level. In the quadratic speci…cation with tenure squared, reported in column (3), the estimated values of 2 and 4 (i.e., the coe¢ cients on the referral indicator multiplied by tenure and tenure squared) are both negative but the coe¢ cients are not estimated very precisely. non-referred workers who stay with the corporation. As we show in Section 5.4 below, we also …nd that referred employees experience signi…cantly lower turnover than non-referred. Taken together, these …ndings suggest a role for di¤erential investments in …rm-speci…c human capital, or perhaps for non-pecuniary gains related to di¤erential a¢ nity between employees already at the …rm and referred vs. non-referred hires. A valuable innovation in the theory of labor market referrals, then, might be an extension of existing models that accounted for these observed patterns.
Finally, it is also evident in Figure 1 that all employees of the corporation enjoy a steep salary increase with tenure, which appears to be the dominant feature of salary trajectories in this corpo-ration for both worker categories.
Unobserved heterogeneity in worker productivity and other characteristics may in ‡uence salary levels, and may itself be correlated with referral status. We examine the sensitivity of our results to underlying worker heterogeneity by re-estimating the above model with worker …xed e¤ects:
where ! i is an individual worker e¤ect, " F i an idiosyncratic error and X F i represents the subset of expression (3) regressors X L it that time vary. Table 6a reports the resulting estimates. Though we are of course unable to identify a starting salary e¤ect of referral using this speci…cation, we …nd an estimated dependence of the referral salary e¤ect on tenure in the corporation similar to that observed in Table 6 . The coe¢ cient on tenure times the referral indicator in each linear speci…cation indicates a 0.7 percent decline in the salary advantage to the referred with each year of experience, and is signi…cant at the one percent level. Hence the …xed e¤ect speci…cation reinforces the evidence that the referred worker salary declines relative to the non-referred worker salary with tenure in the organization.
Returning to the simpler speci…cation in Table 5 , the remaining columns report results for identical speci…cation
with the exception that (again) represents the years of tenure in the corporation at the date of observation. In other words, Table 5 shows results of the linear regression of salary level at tenure (in thousands of 2010 dollars) on referral status and worker characteristics at tenure : Again we see that the positive e¤ect of referral on salary dissipates quickly. In the earlier years of tenure in the corporation, the referral coe¢ cient tends to be positive, though statistically insigni…cant.
After year four, the referral coe¢ cient becomes negative and is statistically signi…cant at six, eight and nine or more years of tenure in the corporation. Salary disadvantages for the referred are, on average, $3,634, $7,689 and $13,343 at six, eight and nine or more years, respectively. 15 In sum, referred workers in this corporation do in fact experience an initial salary advantage followed by a decline to non-referred salary levels, con…rming predictions of theoretical referral models such as Simon and Warner and Dustmann et al. However, we also …nd a signi…cant and economically substantial salary advantage for non-referred workers after …ve years. This is certainly not consistent with the predictions of Simon and Warner, it does not appear to be consistent with the predictions of Dustmann et al, and in general it is not clear how an eventual advantage for non-referred workers who remain with the organization might be aligned with existing theory.
Prediction 4: Turnover is lower for referred workers
Next we turn to the theoretical prediction, reviewed in Section 3.7, that referred workers experience lower rates of turnover after joining a …rm. We model separation from the corporation using the discrete time proportional hazard framework found in Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) and Meyer (1990) .
The instantaneous separation hazard at tenure is
where D 0 ( ) is a baseline match dissolution hazard that is permitted to vary with tenure in the corporation and
Here e Z D i includes entering salary, company division and sta¤ level, current shift, leave status, part time status, and in some speci…cations some subset of the interactions of starting sta¤ level and the referral indicator, an indicator for recession/post-recession dates and the interaction of the recession/post-recession indicator with the referral indicator. We are primarily interested in the e¤ect of referral on the separation hazard, and any variation in the referral e¤ect on separation as tenure increases. Table 7 reports estimates of hazard model (4) . We specify the tenure dependence of baseline hazard D 0 ( ) in one of two ways. In Table 7 speci…cations (1) and (3) through (8), we impose a linear tenure dependence. Speci…cation (2) includes separate dummies for each observed 6 month interval with the corporation, which we refer to as the fully nonparametric baseline hazard model.
Comparing the estimates in speci…cations (1) and (2), it appears that allowing a very ‡exible tenure dependence in the baseline hazard has little e¤ect on the estimates. Further, we have estimated speci…cations (3) through (8) with both linear and fully nonparametric assumptions on the baseline hazard, and our qualitative results are essentially unchanged. In the interest of simplicity, we report speci…cation (3) through (8) estimates assuming a linear baseline hazard.
In addition, the estimated values reported in Table 7 are in terms of exp( ), for ease of interpretation. Where the regressor is an indicator variable, given (4), the reported exp( ) value can be interpreted as the proportional change in the hazard associated with moving from a regressor value of zero to a regressor value of one. This is measured relative to a baseline hazard, which represents the separation hazard of a full time, day shift, not on leave, mid-level, non-referred employee who has just entered the corporation during the pre-recession period. For example, the exp( ) value in speci…cation (1) associated with an on leave worker indicates that, perhaps not surprisingly, a worker currently on leave faces roughly three times the separation hazard of an employee who is not currently on leave, all else equal. Table 7 estimates indicate that referred workers do indeed experience lower separation rates from the corporation. Speci…cations (1) and (2) show that referred workers are about 85 percent as likely to leave the corporation as non-referred workers, and these …ndings are roughly signi…cant at the ten percent level in each case. 16 We …nd that most of this referral e¤ect arises from the pre-recession period. Turning to speci…ca-tion (7), we see that pre-recession referred workers are 76 percent as likely to leave the organization as pre-recession non-referred workers, and this e¤ect has a p-value of 0.045. However, the referral e¤ect on separations for those hired after the start of the recession is much more moderate. For people hired after 2007, referred workers are only 96 percent as likely to leave the corporation compared to non-referred people, and this di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant. Similarly, if one estimates using only the pre-recession sample, as in speci…cation (5), one …nds that referred workers are 77 percent as likely to leave the corporation as non-referred workers, and the p-value for this estimate is 0.056. The period beginning with the recession was one of meaningful changes in employment practices for this particular corporation, as for many others. We …nd substantially decreased turnover from the start of the recession, and decidedly di¤erent hiring practices. Thus it is not surprising that employee referrals appear to function di¤erently for this corporation from the start of the recession.
One might be concerned, given the predicted and observed tenure di¤erential between referred and non-referred workers, that estimates of the salary dynamics of retained workers would re ‡ect confounding dynamic selection e¤ects. It may be helpful to note at this point that the goal of the salary trajectory estimates in Section 5.3 is to test the equilibrium predictions of models like Dustmann et al. and Simon and Warner. Their salary trajectory predictions pertain explicitly to the subset of referred and non-referred workers in ongoing matches, whose empirical analog is the set of referred and non-referred employees who are retained by the corporation. Hence our estimates of the salary trajectories of retained employees are, arguably, the appropriate objects with which to test these predictions. Existing theory has limited or no predictions for the average salary trajectory of all workers who were referred to a match and then stayed or left relative to the average salary trajectory of all workers who were not referred to a match and then stayed or left.
Similarly, our estimates have nothing to say about average salary trajectories that are unconditional on turnover.
Prediction 5: The referred worker turnover advantage also diminishes over time
The signi…cant negative association between employee referrals and separation from the corporation does not appear to diminish with tenure, despite the predictions of the theory. The general …ndings regarding the relationship between tenure and separation in Table 7 appear to be that longertenured workers are signi…cantly less likely to leave the corporation from the start of the recession on, but that tenure in the corporation bears no signi…cant relationship to departure preceding the recession. Speci…cation (3) adds a referral indicator times tenure regressor to the estimation, and based on the speci…cation (3) estimates we see that the separation hazard increment associated with referral does not appear to change in any noticeable way with tenure. Despite the (reasonably intuitive) theoretical prediction that the lower departure rates for referred workers diminish over time as the surviving non-referred workers become a more selected and better-matched group, the empirical results indicate that, for this corporation at least, the decreased separation rate associated with employee referrals is relatively long-lasting.
Prediction 6: Referred workers have higher expected productivity
Theoretical predictions regarding referrals generally emphasize higher initial employer approximations of worker productivity for workers hired through referrals than for workers not hired through referrals. Though both worker productivity and employers'inferences regarding workers'productivity are di¢ cult to measure, an employer's promotion decisions may o¤er a source of information on perceived worker e¤ectiveness. Our dataset includes promotion indicators at six month intervals. More than half of our estimation sample employees receive a promotion at some point in the sample window.
We model the promotion process using approximately the same approach we applied to the tenure process in Section 5.4. In the discrete time proportional hazard framework we apply, the instantaneous promotion hazard is assumed to be
where P 0 ( ) is a baseline promotion hazard that we again allow to vary either linearly or completely non-parametrically with tenure in the organization. This time
with e Z P i including entering salary, company division and sta¤ level, current shift, leave status and part time status, and in some speci…cations some subset of the interactions of starting sta¤ level and the referral indicator, an indicator for recession/post-recession dates and the interaction of the recession/post-recession indicator with the referral indicator. Unlike separations as measured in our data, promotions may arrive more than once for some employees. Our model admits repeated failures, and second and later promotions do contribute to the reported coe¢ cient estimates. We are primarily interested in the e¤ect of referral on the promotion hazard, and any variation in the referral e¤ect on promotion as tenure increases. Table 8 reports the promotion model estimates. Looking …rst at our baseline speci…cation in column (1), we …nd that referred employees are 93 percent as likely to be promoted over a given interval as non-referred employees, all else equal. This di¤erence is not signi…cant at standard levels of con…dence. So, despite the predictions of higher initial perceived productivity that arise from the theory, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal promotion rates for the referred and non-referred, and, if anything, referred employees achieve promotion more slowly than their non-referred peers.
Instead, other employee characteristics appear to drive promotion. Employees with longer tenure in the corporation are signi…cantly more likely to be promoted. One year of tenure increases the promotion probability over the next six months by …ve percentage points, all else equal. Employees with higher starting salaries, conditioning on sta¤ level, are more likely to be promoted.
Not surprisingly, full time, day shift, and active status workers are more likely to be promoted. The relationship between sta¤ level and promotion rate is non-monotonic. Support sta¤ are promoted at only 52 percent the rate of mid-level sta¤, and this di¤erence has a p-value of 0.003. Junior and executive sta¤ are promoted at insigni…cantly higher rates than mid-level sta¤. However, senior sta¤ are promoted at only 84 percent of the rate of mid-level sta¤, and this di¤erence is signi…cant at the ten percent level. Finally, the rate of promotions at this corporation increased following the start of the recession.
As in the case of separation, speci…cation (2) indicates that the promotion results described in this section are robust to linear and non-parametric speci…cations of the tenure dependence of the hazard. Turning to speci…cation (3), we …nd no signi…cant di¤erence in the tenure dependence of promotion rates between the referred and non-referred. Theoretical predictions regarding whether the initial higher productivity of referred workers would be sustained are unclear. In any case, the data for this corporation do not support a meaningful di¤erence in employers'promotion decisions for referred and non-referred workers over time.
Of course, the extent to which the promotion results provide a test of the theoretical predictions regarding perceived worker productivity depend critically on the extent to which promotion decisions are a valid measure of perceived worker productivity. To the extent that promotions are a valid perceived productivity measure, our results do not support the claim that referred workers'perceived initial productivity is signi…cantly higher than non-referred workers'perceived initial productivity.
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Referral e¤ects by skill level
The range of sta¤ levels available in these data, and associated range of starting education and experience levels, in combination with sample sizes of 62,127 applicants, 1,774 workers and 12,447
worker-half years, allows us to make some inferences regarding di¤erences in the role of employee referrals across the markets for di¤erent employee skill levels. In the interest of studying the role of referrals in lower and higher skilled labor markets, we introduce sta¤ level-referral interactions in models (2) (3), (4) and (5) above.
There is strong empirical evidence that informal search methods are used more by workers with lower socioeconomic status and lower education levels, and for 'lower-status'jobs. 17 Looking …rst at the hires data, Table 9 reports estimates of expression (2) in which we have added either education requirement and referral interactions, in columns 1-3, or sta¤ level and referral interactions, in columns 4-6. Again, outcomes are an indicator for whether the applicant interviewed in columns 1 and 4, an indicator for whether the applicant received an o¤er in columns 2 and 5 and an indicator for whether the applicant received an o¤er restricting the sample to interviewees in columns 3 and 6. Our …rst observation is that referrals have a signi…cantly greater impact on the overall probability of o¤er receipt for positions with lower education requirements.
Applicants to postings requiring high school diplomas, associate's degrees and other educational credentials show signi…cantly larger referral e¤ects on o¤er probability than applicants to postings requiring college and graduate degrees. The additional e¤ect of referral for high school, associate's degree and other requirement postings relative to college postings is 2, 4 and 3 percentage points, respectively, and each estimate is signi…cant at the …ve or the one percent level. The high school and other education requirement e¤ects appear to operate mainly through the e¤ect of the referral on being interviewed, while the associate's degree e¤ect operates primarily between the interview and the o¤er stage.
Secondly, referrals also have a signi…cantly larger positive impact on the probability of being interviewed for positions with a graduate rather than college degree requirement. Thus, referral e¤ects seem to have a U-shaped relationship with skill level. We conjecture that the corporation may rely on referrals for di¤erent reasons at di¤erent points of the skill distribution. For positions with lower education requirements, the corporation may use referrals to detect worker traits such as reliability, punctuality, etc. At the high end of the skill distribution, the corporation may be looking for things like initiative, leadership, and strategic thinking. This would certainly be an interesting area for future research.
Turning to the sta¤ levels, referrals have a similar relationship to o¤er receipt for support, junior and senior sta¤ as for mid-level sta¤. Point estimates for support, junior and senior sta¤ indicate a one percentage point smaller referral e¤ect than for mid-level sta¤, and are in some cases signi…cant. 18 For executives, however, the referral e¤ect on o¤er receipt is 4.5 percentage points higher than the referral e¤ect on o¤er receipt for mid-level sta¤, and this di¤erence is signi…cant at the one percent level. Estimated increments to the referral e¤ect for executives relative to mid-level sta¤ are large at both the interview and o¤er stages. Thus the estimates suggest that referrals play a substantially di¤erent role in the hiring of executives than in the hiring of rank-and-…le sta¤, and are again consistent with the idea that the corporation may use referrals to detect qualities such sh leadership and strategic thinking. the referral-executive interaction is -7.9 percent of starting salary, and is signi…cant at the one percent level. On net, the referral e¤ect on initial salary for executives is -4.5 percent relative to non-referred executives, and it is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Hence for executives there seems to be a negative e¤ect of referrals on initial salary. 19 While the estimate for junior sta¤ is not far out of line with the referral e¤ects for the other sta¤ levels, the estimates indicate decisively that referrals play a di¤erent role in determining executive salaries.
Returning to the separation results in Table 7 , we …nd that the negative separation e¤ect of referral we observe for the full sample appears to be largest among the support sta¤. The Table   7 column (4) percent. Echoing the results for initial salary, executives also demonstrate a unique referral-tenure relationship. We …nd that referred executives are substantially more likely to leave the corporation than non-referred mid-level sta¤. Based on the point estimates, referred executives are more than twice as likely to leave as non-referred mid-level sta¤. However, as a result of the relatively small sample of referred executives, this di¤erence is not quite signi…cant at conventional levels. Overall, the separation results indicate large di¤erences in the role of employee referral in labor markets for di¤erent skill levels, with a large positive association between referral and tenure in lower-skilled jobs and some evidence of a negative association between referral and tenure in higher-skilled jobs.
Moving to the promotion results in Table 8 , we observe no signi…cant di¤erences between referred and non-referred promotion rates by sta¤ level. In general, promotion practices appear to be quite similar for the referred and the non-referred.
In sum, employee referrals are associated with strong positive tenure e¤ects for lower skilled workers. For most rank-and-…le workers they also tend to be associated with higher starting salaries.
However, referrals appear to function quite di¤erently in the market for executives. Their referrals are associated with, if anything, shorter -lived matches and lower starting salaries. Our estimates clearly indicate di¤erent roles for referrals across markets for di¤erent worker skill levels. 20 Finally, we have also run our empirical analysis separately for some of the largest divisions within the company, to see whether our results are robust to possibly di¤erent management practices within the company. Our …ndings are qualitatively very similar across the four largest divisions of the corporation, with some variation in the size of the estimated referral e¤ects on outcomes. For instance, the estimated initial salary advantage for referred vs. non-referred workers ranges between 0.8 and 5.4 percent of initial salary across divisions. There is also some evidence in one division that referrals are associated to a higher promotion hazard, suggesting higher perceived productivity for referred hires. Overall, the results are remarkably similar across the entire corporation.
Conclusion
The limited nature of data on employment referrals in large business and household surveys has so far limited our understanding of the relationships among employment referrals, match quality, wage trajectories and turnover. Using a new …rm-level dataset that includes explicit information on whether a worker was referred by a current employee of the company, we are able to provide rich detail on these empirical relationships for a single mid-to-large corporation, and to test various predictions of the theoretical literature on labor market referrals.
We …nd that referred workers enter at higher wage levels, all else equal, but that the referred wage advantage dissipates by the sixth year of employment, after which the referral-wage relationship is reversed. Referred workers experience substantially longer tenure in the corporation.
Despite higher predicted productivity for referred workers in the theoretical literature, we …nd, if anything, slightly slower promotion rates for referred than for non-referred workers. Finally, the wide range of skill and experience levels represented in this corporation permit detailed analysis of the role of referrals for workers from support sta¤ to company executives.
Our …ndings suggest a few interesting avenues for further research. First, we …nd that referred workers tend to stay longer with the company, but eventually experience slower salary growth than non-referred ones. This seems puzzling. As we discussed above, one possible explanation is that referred workers may invest relatively more in …rm-speci…c human capital, which would limit their outside options over time and therefore reduce their bargaining power within the corporation. Another possibility is that the eventual salary disadvantage is compensated by non-pecuniary aspects of the job match, such as a more enjoyable work environment because the referred worker has social contacts within the corporation. We plan to explore this possibility in future work by matching demographic information for the referrer and the referred, and constructing measures of a¢ nity between the referred worker's attributes and his or her co-workers.
Second, we …nd some evidence of a U-shaped relationship between education or skill level, and the size of the referral e¤ect on hiring outcomes. We conjecture that this non-monotonic relationship may be explained by di¤erent roles played by referrals at di¤erent points in the skill distribution.
At low education or skill levels, referrals may be used to better detect desirable worker traits such as punctuality and reliability, whereas at the higher end of the distribution they may be used to screen for traits such as leadership and strategic vision. This could be another interesting area for future research. P-values in parentheses. 1 Year regresses the salary levels with observations from 6 months and 1 year, the subsequent years' regressions follow similarly.
Excluded Category is not referred, day time shift, full time, not on leave, mid-level staff, in the largest division. Controls included company divisions Controls for current year are included 
